In today’s rapidly changing world, political hacks appear almost every day with some new promotional device.
But some of these devices have been known to leave irreparable scars on the minds of foolish young consumers!
One such case is now seated before you.
Ultimately, YOU must decide.
Is STEVE SANSON telling the TRUTH?
The WHOLE TRUTH? And NOTHING BUT?
SANSON vs. ABRAMS (DEUX!)
Below, we see the caption page of the First Amended Complaint, (“FAC”), from STEVE SANSON’S defamation lawsuit, Sanson v. Schoen, [Clark County No. A-23-884249-C].
In the next panel, we see the Verification page of the First Amended Complaint, (“FAC”), (at p. 11), in which STEVE SANSON — under PENALITIES of PERJURY — verifies the facts of his complaint —
In the next panel, we see STEVE SANSON, under penalties of perjury, make the remarkable allegation that he is NOT a PUBLIC FIGURE! 😮
The next panels (below) are from SANSON’S Facebook pages, in which he openly and notoriously ADMITS he *IS* a PUBLIC FIGURE — thus contradicting his sworn statements to the Court — and thus impeaching his already dubious credibility!
Srsly! Folks!– you can’t make th*s shit up! See for yourself! —
In the next panel, we see SANSON’S First Amended Complaint, (“FAC”), (at ¶ 21), in which SANSON makes the rather spurious allegation that he cannot be deemed a “limited purpose” public figure because (get this) SANSON claims he has not thrust himself into a public controversy or public concern —
In this next panel, we see STEVE SANSON — not thrusting himself into an area of public concern —
Again, here’s STEVE SANSON — not thrusting himself into an area of public concern —
Remember, in defamation cases, the “public figure” allegation is an element of plaintiff’s case-in-chief; in other words, it’s a “material” allegation. And thus, it would appear SANSON is affirmatively misleading the court concerning a “material” allegation.
Even viewed in a favorable light, SANSON’S allegation, i.e., that he’s not a public figure, lacks evidentiary support, which constitutes a violation of the statewide certification requirement at Rule 11, [see NRCP, Rule 11(b)(3)].
Viewed in a critical light, SANSON’S allegation, i.e., that he’s not a public figure, carries an audible ring of preposterousness! SANSON impeaches his own credibility — which is now irretrievably shot.
To provide deeper insight into these scandalous developments, Our I-Team met-up with legendary civil rights attorney, T. Matthew Phillips, Esq., at Jimmy John’s, a sandwich shop situated in Boca Park.
Our I-Team sought to speak with T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. because, as our readers know, Phillips is ALSO suing Jennifer Abrams and her crew for defamation.
We asked Mr. Phillips’ opinion, is Steve Sanson a public figure (or not)? “Duuuh!–of course he’s a public figure!” said Phillips.
Phillips continued, “But, seriously, it would appear Mr. Sanson makes false statements of material fact with specific intent to mislead — and I imagine the Abrams defendants will have no trouble impeaching Sanson’s credibility — with his own Facebook posts — in which Sanson makes public admissions that run directly contrary to the material allegations of his sworn affidavit.“
Our I-Team undertook a 0.29-second Google search — which revealed that perjury, in Nevada, is typically a cat-D felony, [see NRS § 199.120].
Our I-Team asked Mr. Phillips — what’s the best way to handle froggy litigants who play reindeer games in court?
“Hey, I’m NOT a Nevada lawyer! But any fool can see the Abrams defendants are wise to give this prestidigitator an ultimatum — immediately withdraw your glaring misstatements of material fact,” continued Phillips, who added, “and if he persists in playing reindeer games, a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees would do quite nicely.”
Phillips explained the anti-SLAPP dynamic! “Look! It’s mathematically impossible for Sanson to win! C’mon! He already blew the statute of limitations! The only question is WHEN will Sanson tap-out! Asked another way, will Sanson tap-out BEFORE Jenny Abrams goes anti-SLAPP?”
Phillips departed the shallow waters: “Dig it. If Sanson taps-out first, then it’s a simple game over. However, if Jenny goes anti-SLAPP first, then Sanson CANNOT tap-out. Once my girl Jenny goes anti-SLAPP, it effectively precludes Sanson from dismissing his own action — and Sanson would thus remain on-the-hook for potential attorney’s fees PLUS the $10,000 bounty.”
Phillips then went deep: “Remember, this scenario played-out in the landmark case, Willick vs. Sanson! Along with Abrams, Willick also brought a STOOPID defamation lawsuit against Sanson. Then, Willick saw Abrams getting Shaq’d on anti-SLAPP, and Willick soon realized he too would have to pay attorney’s fees, plus a $10,000 bounty, and so, Willick tried to flee the battlefield by dismissing his own case, like the cowardly [expletive deleted] that he is! But Carson City wouldn’t let Willick dismiss!”
“That’s right! Once a defendant files an anti-SLAPP, the plaintiff may no longer dismiss his or her own case! In California, this principle is well-established. In Nevada, my boy Willick had to learn it the hard way!”
“How ironic! First, you got Willick ‘n Abrams, aka “Dumb ‘n Dumber,” who bring their cute, little TWINSIE lawsuits against Sanson, but then, they get banged on anti-SLAPP for attorney’s fees, plus the $10,000 bounty! But now, thanks to the ever-turning Wheel of Fate, the roles have been REVERSED! Now, you got Sanson facing attorney’s fees and FIVE bounties — at $10,000 apiece — for the FIVE Abrams defendants! So, yeah, it’s a RACE to the courthouse — will Sanson dismiss his [expletive deleted] lawsuit BEFORE Jenny brings down the anti-SLAPP thunder!“
Sources close to the investigation reveal the Abrams defendants have until Apr. 18, 2024 to file a responsive pleading.
Our I-Team checked the sporting odds at Caesar’s. Apparently, it’s a bullish bettor’s market. They’re giving 5:4 odds that the Abrams defendants will go full anti-SLAPP.
So, that’s our report from UFC APEX! And, yeah, we’re expecting a Freaky, Fast, Finish for Sanson and his bogus FLAWSUIT. 😀
EDITORIAL STAFF ATOMIC COURT WATCHERS ~ “I” TEAM
Next Week’s Cliffhanger Episode
Will the ABRAMS defendants move to declare SANSON vexatious?!
Will they allow FALCONI to submit a media request to broadcast ABRAMS’ highly anticipated 12(b)(5) motion? And, if so, will FALCONI publicly ridicule SANSON in the opening 15-second bumper of the ONJ video?
“If fools did not go to market cracked pots and false wares would not be sold.” James M. McGill, Esq.
Hey, stewardess, is there a movie on this flight?” Seriously?
Buckle-up! It’s gonna be one helluva bumpy ride!
Friends! Romans! Fight Fans! Atomic Court Watchers I-Team continues its LIVE, ongoing coverage of the ultimate, no-holds-barred, mixed martial arts, grudge match at UFC APEX! Daniel Cormier is calling it the Defamation Case of the Century! — Sanson vs. Abrams — Deux! [Clark County No. A-23-884249-C].
Atomic Court Watchers I-Team has gone behind the scenes! — to bring you an exclusive sneak peak at the ruling!
We’re good like that.
Ladies ‘n gents, without further ado, our Atomic Court Watchers I-Team exclusively presents this exclusive presentation!
So, click on the link to download Sanson vs. Abrams — Deux!
Taken just moments after prevailing, attorneys James M. McGill and Kimberly A. Wexler celebrate their victory over Steve Sanson and Veterans in Politics at Eighth Judicial District Court, (July 19, 2024). [Photo courtesy of UTI]
“Perfection is the enemy of the perfectly adequate.” James M. McGill, Esq.
DATELINE: Sacramento, Calif., June 14, 2023 — Yesterday, the California Senate passed Assembly Bill No. 957, which provides that parents may lose custody of their children — and ultimately go to jail — if they refuse to “affirm” their child’s transgender status.
And now, Sacramento insiders today revealed that California Governor, Gavin Newsome, will soon sign Senate Bill No. 182 — which requires Child Protective Services, (“CPS”), to perform “in-home inspections” and “custody evaluations” prior to moms being allowed to leave hospitals with newborns.
Proponents hail the bill as a victory for neonatal rights. However, opponents see it as another Newsom assault on constitutional rights.
In support, Dr. Kaye Shozeh, California Dept. of Soc. Svcs., stated, “The health and safety of your child is our top priority.”
According to family law experts, the State’s paramount concern is the child’s “best interests.”
Senior litigation attorney, Wilfrid Robarts, Esq., San Bernardino County Fathers’ Rights Legal Group, explained, “Yes, the State has authority to enter your home — to ensure the safety of your kids.”
In opposition, California civil rights attorney, T. Matthew Phillips, Esq., spouted, “No! — this is one of the most overreaching governmental overreaches in the history of governmental overreach!“
Attorney Phillips added, “Seriously, am I the only one who watched AMC Breaking Bad? — Remember Jesse Pinkman in the R.V.?” — “This is my own private domicile — and I will not be harassed …. B-word!“
State Senator, Richard Pan — who last week announced his bid for Mayor of Sacramento — supports RainbowAmendments to the Constitution — to ensure the safety of all t-children.
On a related note, an unnamed Sacramento insider described the Constitution as a “stale-dated document written by toxic, white males who owned slaves and wouldn’t even let women vote.”
Our I-Team spoke with New Mexico criminal rights attorney, Saul Goodman, Esq., who believes the bill is unconstitutional. “C’mon! — the Fourth Amendment prohibits CPS from entering your home — unless they have a search warrant supported by probable cause! — Now, what’s for lunch, huh?”
Sources close to the investigation indicate the proposed bill could be on Newsom’s desk early next week. ~~ Maggie Corbin (Contributing Editor)
* * *
Yes, you’ve been hoaxed. 🙂
There is, of course, no S.B. 182 — this is just a glimpse into the dark future that lay ahead for American parents.
If you believe the gov’t has no authority to impose in-home inspections — at the time of birth — then by what authority does the gov’t impose such inspections — at the time of divorce?
A.B. 957, on the other hand, is very real indeed.
The cold, hard truth about A.B. 957 is this — if parents refuse to affirm that their t-children should be castrated (by puberty blockers), then those parents will lose custody and go to jail — and the State will then castrate their children — free from parental interference.
Know your rights!
Tell others!
#AtomicCourtWatchers
Produced and Directed by TMP’s Midnight Minions in association with Chapter Eleven Productions, Fly-By-Night Management Services, and Neurotica Entertainment Group
Copyright 2023 – by T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.
“Freedom means nothing if you can’t keep the government away from your children.” ~ T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. ~
Thirteen SCOTUS Decisions on Parenting! by T. Matthew Phillips, Attorney-at-Law U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048
Meyer vs. Nebraska — (1923)
Meyer vs. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390 (1923): One hundred years ago, SCOTUS first recognized the right to parent as a “liberty” interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees. Mr. Meyer, a school-teacher, was convicted on a criminal statute for teaching the German language, in a parochial school, to a 10-year-old. SCOTUS held that the statute invaded the “liberty” interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees.
SCOTUS ruled that the 14th Amendment, “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,” [Meyer vs. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); (bold italics added)].
“Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life,” [id. at 400]. “His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment,” [id. at 400].
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters – (1925)
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925): SCOTUS held that the 14th Amendment “liberty” interest excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children — by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations,” [Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); (bold italics added)].
Prince vs. Massachusetts – (1944)
Prince vs. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944): SCOTUS struck-down a state statute, which provided that no minor shall sell, in public places, any newspapers, magazines or periodicals.
“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder . . . And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” [Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); (bold italics added)].
Stanley vs. Illinois – (1972)
Stanley vs. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972): Under state law, children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, were declared wards of the state — with no hearing on the father’s fitness and no proof of child neglect by the father. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a father could be separated from his children upon mere proof that he and the dead mother were not married and they further held that father’s fitness was irrelevant. SCOTUS reversed, holding that unmarried fathers have a 14th Amendment liberty interest in raising their children.
“[T]he State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents,” [Stanley vs. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)].
“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him,” [id. at 645; (bold italics added]. “Parental unfitness must be established on the basis of individualized proof,” [id. at 645].
“The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection,” [id., at 651]. “We think the Due Process Clause mandates a similar result here. The State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father,” [id., at 658].
SCOTUS ruled that, under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, father was “entitled to ahearing on [his] fitness” as a parent before the state took his children and placed them in guardianships, [id., at 647–658; (bold italics added)].
Under the Due Process Clause, the state cannot “justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family,” [id. at 658]. “[A]ll Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody,” [id., at 658; (bold italics added)].
Wisconsin vs. Yoder – (1972)
Wisconsin vs. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972): Members of the Amish community were convicted for violating the State’s compulsory school attendance law. SCOTUS reversed these convictions under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
“The values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society,” [Wisconsin vs. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, at 213–214 (1972)]. “Even more markedly than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children,” [id., at 232; (bold italics added)]. “This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition,” [id., at 232; (bold italics added)].
Moore vs. East Cleveland – (1977)
Moore vs. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977): An Ohio housing ordinance limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of a single family; however, the ordinance defined “family” in such a way that one particular household — consisting of a mother, her son, and her two grandsons — did not qualify for occupancy, and in fact, constituted a crime. SCOTUS overturned the mother’s criminal conviction.
“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’shistory and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural,” [Moore vs. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, at 503–504 (1977); (bold italics added)].
Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families – (1977)
Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977): This case raised the novel question of whether foster homes are entitled to the same constitutional deference as biological families. SCOTUS ruled that, “[t]he liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in “this Nation’s history and tradition.” ” [Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977), citing Moore vs. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, at 503; (bold italics added)].
“If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on “the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” ” [Smith, supra, at 862-863, citing Prince vs. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); (bold italics added)].
Quilloin vs. Walcott – (1978)
Quilloin vs. Walcott, 434U.S. 246 (1978): Georgia law required only the mother’s consent for the adoption of an illegitimate child. Here, an unmarried father tried to halt adoption of his illegitimate child. However, the father had taken no steps to support or legitimate the child over a period of 11 years; so too, the father had never been a member of the child’s family unit. As a result, SCOTUS upheld the adoption.
“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected,” [Quilloin vs. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); (bold italics added)]. “We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended, “if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest,” ” [Quilloin, supra, at 255; citing Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977); (bold italics added)].
Parham vs. J.R. – (1979)
Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979): SCOTUS validated the State’s procedures for admitting children to state mental hospitals. “The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children,” [Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); (bold italics added)].
“The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition,” [Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)]. “Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state,” [id., at 603]. “[W]e conclude that our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child should apply,” [id. at 604; (bold italics added)].
Santosky vs. Kramer – (1982)
Santosky vs. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982): Under New York law, the state could terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their children — upon a finding that the child is permanently neglected.
“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State,” [Santosky vs. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); (bold italics added)]. “Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life,” [id., at 753].
“Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence,” [id., at 746; (bold italics added)]. “[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship,” [id., at 760); (bold italics added)].
“[T]he parens patriae interest favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds,” [id., at 767–768); (bold italics added)]. “Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness,” [id., at footnote 10; (bold italics added)]. “Any parens patriae interest in terminating the natural parents’ rights arises only at the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unfit,” [id., at footnote 17].
Rotary Int’l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte – (1987)
Rotary Int’l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987): Rotary Int’l excluded women from membership, while Rotary Duarte admitted women; as a result, Rotary Int’l terminated Rotary Duarte’s membership in the international organization. By requiring Rotary Clubs in California to admit women, California’s anti-discrimination statute does not violate the First Amendment. So too, the statute did not unduly interfere with club members’ freedom of private association.
“We have emphasized that the First Amendment protects those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose “deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” ” [Rotary Int’l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987), citing, Roberts vs. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-620 (1984); (bold italics added)].
Reno vs. Flores – (1993)
Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993): Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation provided that alien juveniles — detained on suspicion of being deportable — may be released only to a parent, legal guardian, or other related adult. SCOTUS held that the regulation accords with the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act.
SCOTUS held that the Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference with fundamental rights and liberty interests, [Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993)].
“ “The best interests of the child,” a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody. But it is not traditionally the sole criterion — much less the sole constitutional criterion — for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others,” [Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)].
“ “[T]he best interests of the child” is not the legal standard that governs parents’ or guardians’ exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves,” [id., at 304; (bold italics added)].
Troxel vs. Granville – (2000)
Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000): The State of Washington had allowed “any person” to petition for visitation rights, and further allowed family courts to grant visitation where it served a child’s “best interests.” The grandparents, (the Troxels), successfully petitioned for visitation with the children of their deceased son. The mother, (Granville), objected to the amount of visitation ordered. The Washington Supreme Court held that state law unconstitutionally infringed on the mother’s fundamental right to parent. SCOTUS affirmed, holding that the Washington law, as applied, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause. “First, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, citing Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; (bold italics added)].
“[T]here is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to make the best decisions regarding their children,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), citing Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, at 304 (1993)].
According to the Washington Supreme Court, “the Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child,” [id. at 57; (bold italics added)]. The state statute was too broad; it allowed “any person” to petition, with the only requirement being whether visitation served the child’s “best interests.” States may interfere with the right to parent only to prevent harm to a child. “[T]here is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to make the best decisions regarding their children,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000); (bold italics added)]. “[T]he State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding visitation with third parties,” [id. at 58].
“The liberty interest at issue in this case — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); (bold italics added)].
SCOTUS noted that “the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children,” [id. at 68].
“In effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters,” [id. at 69]. “In that respect, the court’s presumption failed to provide any protection for Granville’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters,” [id. at 69–70]. “Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination,” [id. at 70].
“The Washington Superior Court failed to accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any material weight,” [id. at 72]. “As we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made,” [id. at 72–73].
“We have long recognized that a parent’s interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” [id. at 77].
These Supreme Court case law citations form the basis of our proposed Parental Bill of Rights (click below!)
THE PARENTAL BILL of RIGHTS by T. Matthew Phillips, Attorney-at-Law U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048
A proposed BILL to ensure the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS of PARENTS are honored and protected in the nation’s FAMILY COURTS.
The 14th Amendment guarantees “liberty,” which includes the People’s right to raise children; this fundamental right to parent includes the right to care, custody, and control of one’s children; so too, children enjoy an accompanying right, i.e., the right to be parented by their natural parents.
All parents are presumed fit. No court may restrict or terminate a parent’s custodial rights unless there is first a fitness proceeding — where the state proves child abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., which can be objectively verified without resort to judicial discretion.
A properly noticed fitness proceeding must include: (i) notice to the accused parent concerning the factual allegations of child abuse or neglect, and (ii) an admonition that, if the accused parent is found unfit — based on clear and convincing evidence — the state may restrict or terminate that parent’s custodial rights.
Fit parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children; absent findings of unfitness, equal protection demands that two fit parents share equal and undivided custodial rights.
A child’s best interests reside with fit parents; absent findings of unfitness, the state may not enter the private family realm. No court has legal authority, (“jurisdiction”), to determine a child’s best interests — unless both parents are deemed unfit after a properly noticed fitness trial.
Unless there is actual harm to a child — meaning abuse or neglect as defined by black-letter law — a parent’s bad behavior or felonious misconduct provides no legal basis to restrict or terminate custodial rights. No court may restrict or terminate custodial rights as punishment for misconduct against any person, including the other parent.
All orders restricting or terminating custodial rights must include strict scrutiny analyses, i.e., was the custody order narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling gov’t interest?—and, did the court employ the least-restrictive means of effectuating that interest?
The First Amendment guarantees a fundamental right to familial association — including the right to private speech with one’s children. No court may impose time, place, or manner restrictions on a parent’s right to free speech with a child, (e.g., at supervised visits), unless that parent is found unfit.
All temporary custody orders must have expiration dates; temporary custody orders with no expiration dates are null and void. No temporary order restricting custodial rights shall remain in effect longer than 60 days, after which: (i) the order must expire, or (ii) a fitness trial must commence.
All parents in domestic proceedings are presumed innocent of criminal accusations unless or until the state, in a criminal proceeding, proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to a criminal complaint, (“indictment”). No court may sua sponte conclude that a parent committed a crime.
Dateline: Las Vegas, Nev., Nov. 11, 2022. Unnamed sources close to the investigation indicate that a Clark County family court judge — Mathew P. Harter — died on Wed. Nov. 9, 2022, having committed suicide with a firearm.
Harter was on administrative leave at the time.
Our Atomic I-Team managed to obtain, from unofficial sources, an unofficial copy of Harter’s suicide note, which we below reproduce and transcribe.
TRANSCRIBED
“I hear the cries of children at night. I see their faces grow sallow with alienation. Who draws the line between what’s wrong and right?”
“And when I ask what my life’s been for, it’s all been for nothing. Save your regrets for the dead. Pain is for the living. It hurts so much. This suffering must stop. (Unintelligible)”
“This I do knowing that, for once, I acted in the best interests of the children.”
MPH
MANDATORY PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS
for ALL FAMILY COURT JUDGES NOW!
And when they demand YOUR psych evaluation, insist they produce an affidavit supported by probable cause!
“Through the Looking-Glass: Summary of TMP’s Arguments to the U.S. Supreme Court” by T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.
First,family courts wrongfully allow parents to act as “private prosecutors” — to privately prosecute criminal causes of action against one another. However, parents lack “standing” to bring criminal complaints in the midst of child custody disputes. Besides, there’s no such thing as a private right to bring criminal causes of action. Only the state may bring criminal causes of action — and only in the name of the People. Where litigants are allowed to play the dual roles of “prosecutor” and “victim,” the case wrongfully morphs into a “vigilante” proceeding. Family courts violate the right to a fair trial, [14th Amdt] by allowing vigilante justice — with one parent playing the role of both “victim” and “prosecutor.”
Second,family courts wrongfully allow judges, with no underlying criminal complaint, (aka “indictment”), to try and convict parents on criminal statutes. Family court judges routinely find and conclude that parents violate criminal statutes — despite the fact that there are no underlying criminal complaints, (“indictments”). However, where there are no underlying criminal complaints, no judge has subject-matter jurisdiction, (“legal authority”), to make criminal findings and conclusions. Family courts violate due process, [14th Amdt], by trying and convicting parents on criminal statutes — with no supporting criminal complaint. Sadly, the accused parents never receive notice of (i) the criminal facts alleged, nor (ii) the criminal statutes allegedly violated. But again, with no underlying criminal complaint, the family court judge necessarily lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, (“legal authority”), to adjudicate criminal accusations. And, perhaps more importantly, where judges lack subject-matter jurisdiction, for want of a supporting indictment, such judges are powerless to issue orders; and, where judges do issue orders with no subject-matter jurisdiction — such orders are deemed nullities — “void” ab initio, of no force or effect, from the date of issuance.
Third, family courts wrongfully allow judges to conclude that parents violate criminal statutes based on “clear and convincing” evidence, but this standard-of-proof is too low. When it comes to adjudicating criminal statutes, the proper evidentiary standard, of course, is the constitutional standard, i.e., “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Family courts violate due process, [14th Amdt], by using a standard-of-proof too low for criminal statutes; (and, now that you mention it, criminal statutes should be argued in criminal courts in the first place!). Ironically, both family courts and criminal courts convict individuals on the same criminal statutes — but with different evidentiary standards. For example, criminal courts adjudicate NRS 207.190, (“coercion”), on the higher, “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard; however, family courts relax the evidentiary standard — adjudicating the same criminal statute — on the lower, “clear-and-convincing” standard. Truth is, in family courts, criminal statutes are put to an “off-label” use. Criminal statutes are obviously designed and intended to put the bad guys behind bars, but family courts use the same criminal statutes as pretext to kidnap your children! Again, the proper evidentiary standard on criminal statutes is the constitutional standard, i.e., “beyond a reasonable doubt” — regardless of whether the courthouse happens to be labeled “C” for “criminal” or “F” for “family.” And, most significantly, the “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard must be decided, not by a judge, but by a jury!
Fourth, family courts wrongfully allow judges to control the fact-finding by abolishing the parent’s right to trial-by-jury — the most precious of all civil liberties. Jury trials are the last best hope to check unbridled judicial discretion (which may explain why Las Vegas, Nevada designed its family court with NO jury boxes!). But still, where litigants face criminal accusations — and the possible punishment is limitation or termination of fundamental rights, (for example, the right to parent) — such litigants are entitled to a jury trial. Family courts violate the Sixth Amendment — by denying jury trials to parents accused of violating criminal statutes — in instances where the possible punishment includes deprivation of parental rights, which, for parents, is an ever-present Sword of Damocles!
Fifth, family courts wrongfully allow judges to conclude that parents violate criminal statutes, even though the parents are never proven guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt” — and this defeats the constitutional “presumption of innocence.” Remember, unless or until the state proves guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” family court judges must presume all parents are innocent — and that they never violated a criminal statute. Until the moment comes when the state actually proves a parent guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt,” no judge may conclude that a parent violated a criminal statute. By allowing judges to conclude that parents violate criminal statutes — despite the fact that the state has never proven guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” — family court violates the parent’s right to “presumption of innocence,” [5th & 6th Amdts].
To justify the rampant judicial kidnappings, family courts must turn parents into criminals. And thus, the objective of family court is the mass criminalization of American parents. Notably, this criminalization comes, not in the criminal court system, but in the family court system — where criminal allegations are much easier to prove because family court features: (i) no indictment requirement, (ii) a private prosecutor, (iii) a relaxed evidentiary standard, (iv) no presumption of innocence, and (v) no jury trials.
The question presented is this — where parents stand accused of violating criminal statutes, and possible punishments include limitation or termination of parental rights, must family courts recognize the parents’ entitlement to the “rights of the accused?” — [5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments]? “Yes!” — because the constitutional right to parent hangs in the balance! The “rights of the accused” should indeed extend to family court parents accused of violating criminal statutes — in instances where the possible punishment includes limitation or termination of parental rights. In America, all persons accused of crimes — who stand to lose fundamental liberties — are entitled to the benefits and protections of the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.
Rule-of-Law — where parents stand accused of committing crimes, and possible punishments include deprivations of parental rights, family courts must recognize the accused parents’ rights under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.
Know your rights! ~~TMP.
“Call the first witness,” said the King; and the White Rabbit blew three blasts on the trumpet, and called out, “First witness!”
DOWN the RABBIT HOLE!
Does the King of Hearts have subject-matter jurisdiction, (legal authority), to try the Knave of Hearts — for stealing the Queen’s tarts? Well, it depends on whether the Knave has been indicted on a burglary or theft statute. The 14th Amendment requires the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office to file a criminal complaint, (aka “indictment”), containing due process notice of some burglary or theft-related statute.
The 14th Amendment provides that the Knave of Hearts is entitled to receive a criminal complaint containing due process notice, which means notice of (i) the criminal facts surrounding the tarts, and (ii) the criminal statutes allegedly violated.
Must the King legally presume the Knave innocent? Yes! — his innocence must be presumed — until the day comes when the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office actually proves the Knave guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And, in order to maintain his presumption of innocence, the King may not conclude that the Knave violated any criminal statute — unless or until a jury so concludes — and only under the constitutional standard of proof, i.e., the “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard, [see 5th and 6th Amdts.].
Should the King of Hearts be allowed to play the role of “prosecutor?” No! — because his wife, (the Queen), is the “victim!” Vigilante justice defeats the right to a “fair trial,” [see 14th Amdt.]. If charges are to be brought, the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office must bring them — and bring them in the name of the People.
Next, may the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office establish guilt under the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard? No! — criminal cases must be proven to a Wonderland jury, “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Finally, is the Knave of Hearts entitled to trial-by-jury? Boy howdy! Of course, he is! The Sixth Amendment requires trial-by-jury. So too, the Fifth Amendment entitles the Knave to Miranda warnings, preliminary hearings, and assistance of counsel, etc.
“In the very middle of the court was a table, with a large dish of tarts upon it: they looked so good, that it made Alice quite hungry to look at them–`I wish they’d get the trial done,’ she thought, `and hand around the refreshments!'”
“Silver Bullet Playbook on Trial!“ Lawsuit for Fraud-Upon-the-Court by T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. (Calif. Lic. No. 165833)
Friends! Romans! Fight fans! Many parents make motions to vacate family court orders obtained through fraud upon the court. Well, here’s a full-blown lawsuit — against the ex’s attorney — to vacate a custody order — for alleged fraud upon the court. (Click on pdf below!)
Okay, so why sue the ex’s attorney for “fraud upon the court?” The main reason to bring such a lawsuit is to void-out court orders based on alleged fraud.
What is “fraud upon the court?” Well, to begin, it’s substantially different than “garden-variety fraud.” So, what’s the difference?
Generally speaking, garden-variety fraud is when someone cheats you out of money, or sells you fake merchandise and you want your money back, plus punitive damages, etc.
In contrast, fraud upon the court is when someone cheats the “judicial machinery” itself.
Remember, when it comes to fraud upon the court, “money” is not the focus, (which, frankly, makes this type of lawsuit totally tantalizing!).
Long story short, garden-variety fraud happens where the fraudulent activity is directed at PEOPLE, while fraud upon the court happens where the fraudulent activity is directed at the COURT. (Capisci?)
In my lawsuit against the ex’s lawyer, the plaintiff, (which is I), seeks NO money damages. I demand only my constitutional right to “trial by jury” — to prove the fraud and thereby overturn the bogus custody order, which I believe is tainted and thus void.
Questions? Google this term —>> “Fraud Upon the Court”
WITHOUT FURTHER ADO, here’s the lawsuit, Phillips vs. Wilson, [Case No. A-22-851472-C, (Clark County, Nev.; (April 21, 2022)] “Bamm!” 🙂
Formerly married-with-children, Joseph K. suddenly found himself in the midst of a nightmarish legal drama. Joseph K. was the named defendant in a family court matter — the case of K. vs. K.
And then, there was a plot twist. Mrs. K. suddenly alleged — during the marriage — that Joseph K. had committed crimes constituting domestic violence.
Curiously, during the marriage, Mrs. K. never called 911 and she filed no police reports. But now, Mrs. K. would file criminal charges, not in the criminal court system, but rather, in the family court system.
Notably, no law enforcement agency formed probable cause to suspect that Joseph K. committed any crimes constituting domestic violence.
Perhaps most significant, Joseph K. was never “indicted” (formally charged) for any crimes constituting domestic violence. But still, despite the fact that he was never “indicted,” the family court would nevertheless “try” him — for crimes constituting domestic violence.
Instead of calling it a “trial,” they would call it an “evidentiary hearing.” Joseph K. wondered — did they use the term “evidentiary hearing” to camouflage one’s right to a fair “trial?“
Joseph K. believed a jury would be unpersuaded by Mrs. K.’s “he-said, she-said” testimonials. But then, Joseph K. suddenly realized that the courtroom — in which the State would “try” him — had no jury boxes, which quickly eliminated any hope of a jury trial.
“How Kafkaesque,” thought Joseph K.
N.Y. Times Bestseller “THE TRIAL” (1968) by T. Matthew Phillips
Joseph K. sat motionless under fluorescent tube-lights. The judge called the matter of K. vs. K. The judge asked family members to leave the courtroom. Joseph K. would be prosecuted “in-private.”
Fighting back tears, Mrs. K. raised her right hand and swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but. The evidentiary hearing had commenced. Joseph K. was now “on trial.”
Mrs. K. testified that Joseph K. committed crimes constituting domestic violence. Stalking! Harassment! Coercion! With tear-filled eyes, blackened from running mascara, Mrs. K. testified that she was in reasonable fear for her life. The bailiff gave her a Kleenex.
When it was his turn to testify, Joseph K. categorically denied Mrs. K.’s allegations. It was the best he could do. Joseph K. was unable to produce any tangible evidence to prove he wasn’t guilty — of committing the serious felonies of which Mrs. K. had accused him.
The trial concluded. The judge found that Joseph K. did commit specific criminal acts — as defined by criminal statutes.
Based on its “factual findings” — that Joseph K. did commit specific criminal acts — the court went on to make “legal conclusions” — that Joseph K. did commit domestic violence, (“D.V.”). And, based on its D.V. findings and conclusions, the court invoked the dreaded D.V. presumption.
The court then handed-down a civil death sentence — the court summarily terminated Joseph K.’s parental rights.
If, God forbid, his son were in the hospital on life-support, Joseph K. has no say-so.
To add insult, Joseph K.’s name now appears in the Central Repository for State Records of Criminal History. Joseph K. paused to reflect on his unhappy situation. The State brands him a criminal, and yet, remarkably, the State never indicted him for any crime…
Joseph K. was tried and convicted for crimes, but with no underlying indictments. He felt as if he got railroaded. But then again, a middle-class, Bohemian, German-speaking, Czech Jew, living in Prague, back in 1922, did not enjoy the constitutional liberties we Americans enjoy today.
N.Y. Times Bestseller “THE TRIAL” (1957) by T. Matthew Phillips
It was a glorious morning when Joseph K. first read the Austro-Hungarian State Constitution, which provides, “No person shall be tried” … “for an infamous crime” … “except on indictment.”
Above Joseph K.’s head, a light bulb flickered *on!* The court had tried him — for crimes constituting domestic violence — but with no underlying indictments — and in so doing — the court violated the State Constitution, which plainly provides that, “No person shall be tried” … “for an infamous crime” … “except on indictment.”
As it turns out, domestic violence *is* an “infamous crime.” Indeed!–it’s a crime of moral turpitude.
Joseph K. reasoned that, with no supporting indictments, the family court necessarily lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to “try” parents for crimes. Furthermore, because the family court has no criminal jurisdiction, it is powerless to make criminal findings in a child custody order.
In short, there’s no such thing as criminal findings in civil proceedings.
It then donned on Joseph K. that his custody order is automatically void — for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction! Joseph K. thus filed legal briefs arguing that — because the judge made “criminal findings” — with no subject-matter jurisdiction to make such findings — his custody order is of no force or effect — in other words, void!
Joseph K. makes a simple argument. He contends his custody order, which relies on criminal findings, is automatically void — for lack of jurisdiction — because the court had no right to “try” him for crimes in the first place — because, of course, he was never charged criminally.
Feeling discombobulated, Joseph K. found himself stranded in kangaroo court quicksand. Later that night, he went through a series of metamorphoses. The next morning, he awoke and found himself transformed — into a giant insect.
The End.
Or is it?
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE is a CRIME.
D.V. ALLEGATIONS BELONG in CRIMINAL COURT — NOT FAMILY COURT.
Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 8
“No person shall be tried” … “for an infamous crime” … “except on indictment.”
Atomic Court Watchers 