Petulant News Reporters. What’s a parent to do?–when petulant news reporters start filing motions in the midst of your family law case?! Family court is headache enough already — without the added stress of petulant news reporters! Srsly!–what can you do? Ever consider filing a motion to strike? Under Rule 11(a)?
“I’ve successfully used Rule 11(a) to strike Falconi filings — and I’ll do it again.”
~~ T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. ~~
NRCP, Rule 11(a). Rule 11(a) provides all pleadings “must be signed by at least one attorney of record … or by a party,” [Rule 11(a)]. And thus, Rule 11(a) forbids Falconi and his attorney from signing pleadings in other people’s cases. Why?–because, of course, Falconi and his attorney are NOT “parties” or “attorneys of record” in other people’s cases.
The Signature Requirement. If you, in your custody case, were to object to a proposed media order, neither Falconi nor his attorney may file papers responding to your objections. Why?–because neither Falconi nor his attorney are legally eligible to sign papers in your case. Again, Rule 11(a) requires that all papers filed into your case must be signed by either: (i) an attorney of record, or (ii) a party, [Rule 11(a)]. And thus, with no eligible signature, all attempted filings by non-parties — as a matter of law — “must” be stricken, i.e., for lack of eligible signature, [Rule 11(a)].
Unsigned Papers. It’s legally *impossible* for non-parties to affix signatures on papers filed into your case. And, with no legal ability for non-parties to sign papers, all non-party filings are thus deemed unsigned papers — and pursuant to black-letter law — “[t]he court must strike an unsigned paper,” [Rule 11(a)]. Et, voilà!
Unsigned Papers Must Be Stricken. Simply stated, Rule 11(a) provides that — where papers filed into a case bear no signatures from parties or attorneys of record, such papers are deemed unsigned — and must be stricken. Yeah!–it’s that simple! 😀
No Judicial Discretion. And, here’s the best part — there’s no room for judicial discretion! The reader will note, Rule 11 relies on the verb *MUST* — as in, “[t]he court MUST strike an unsigned paper,” [Rule 11(a)]. Capisci?
No Rule 11 Sanctions. Note also, the Rule 11 “certification” applies only to parties and their attorneys of record; therefore, news reporters and other non-parties, as a matter of law, cannot certify pleadings in your custody case. And, perhaps more significantly, non-parties cannot be subject to Rule 11 sanctions motions, which effectively prejudices the parties by making inaccessible a powerful litigation tool.
No Jurisdictional Basis. When all’s said, despite your best efforts, a judge may ultimately allow camera access in your custody case; however, there’s still no legal basis for news reporters to engage in motion practice in your case. And, if the judge sets a briefing schedule that allows news reporters to submit briefs, then demand that the judge identify the jurisdictional basis that allows non-parties to engage in motion practice in the midst of your case. (Spoiler alert: it doesn’t exist.)
Know Your Rights. Remember, under Nevada law, a news reporter may do only one thing, i.e., make media requests — and that’s it, [SCR 230]. Whether camera access will impair the parties’ right to privacy or a fair trial — is a matter between the parties and the court. Petulant news reporters, as a matter of law, lack standing to engage in motion practice in your custody case. #KnowYourRights
EDITORIAL STAFF ATOMIC COURT WATCHERS ~ “I” TEAM 🙂
“The only way that entire car is worth five hundred bucks is if there’s a three hundred dollar hooker sitting in it.” James M. McGill, Esq.
In today’s rapidly changing world, political hacks appear almost every day with some new promotional device.
But some of these devices have been known to leave irreparable scars on the minds of foolish young consumers!
One such case is now seated before you.
Ultimately, YOU must decide.
Is STEVE SANSON telling the TRUTH?
The WHOLE TRUTH? And NOTHING BUT?
SANSON vs. ABRAMS (DEUX!)
Below, we see the caption page of the First Amended Complaint, (“FAC”), from STEVE SANSON’S defamation lawsuit, Sanson v. Schoen, [Clark County No. A-23-884249-C].
In the next panel, we see the Verification page of the First Amended Complaint, (“FAC”), (at p. 11), in which STEVE SANSON — under PENALITIES of PERJURY — verifies the facts of his complaint —
In the next panel, we see STEVE SANSON, under penalties of perjury, make the remarkable allegation that he is NOT a PUBLIC FIGURE! 😮
The next panels (below) are from SANSON’S Facebook pages, in which he openly and notoriously ADMITS he *IS* a PUBLIC FIGURE — thus contradicting his sworn statements to the Court — and thus impeaching his already dubious credibility!
Srsly! Folks!– you can’t make th*s shit up! See for yourself! —
In the next panel, we see SANSON’S First Amended Complaint, (“FAC”), (at ¶ 21), in which SANSON makes the rather spurious allegation that he cannot be deemed a “limited purpose” public figure because (get this) SANSON claims he has not thrust himself into a public controversy or public concern —
In this next panel, we see STEVE SANSON — not thrusting himself into an area of public concern —
Again, here’s STEVE SANSON — not thrusting himself into an area of public concern —
Remember, in defamation cases, the “public figure” allegation is an element of plaintiff’s case-in-chief; in other words, it’s a “material” allegation. And thus, it would appear SANSON is affirmatively misleading the court concerning a “material” allegation.
Even viewed in a favorable light, SANSON’S allegation, i.e., that he’s not a public figure, lacks evidentiary support, which constitutes a violation of the statewide certification requirement at Rule 11, [see NRCP, Rule 11(b)(3)].
Viewed in a critical light, SANSON’S allegation, i.e., that he’s not a public figure, carries an audible ring of preposterousness! SANSON impeaches his own credibility — which is now irretrievably shot.
To provide deeper insight into these scandalous developments, Our I-Team met-up with legendary civil rights attorney, T. Matthew Phillips, Esq., at Jimmy John’s, a sandwich shop situated in Boca Park.
Our I-Team sought to speak with T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. because, as our readers know, Phillips is ALSO suing Jennifer Abrams and her crew for defamation.
We asked Mr. Phillips’ opinion, is Steve Sanson a public figure (or not)? “Duuuh!–of course he’s a public figure!” said Phillips.
Phillips continued, “But, seriously, it would appear Mr. Sanson makes false statements of material fact with specific intent to mislead — and I imagine the Abrams defendants will have no trouble impeaching Sanson’s credibility — with his own Facebook posts — in which Sanson makes public admissions that run directly contrary to the material allegations of his sworn affidavit.“
Our I-Team undertook a 0.29-second Google search — which revealed that perjury, in Nevada, is typically a cat-D felony, [see NRS § 199.120].
Our I-Team asked Mr. Phillips — what’s the best way to handle froggy litigants who play reindeer games in court?
“Hey, I’m NOT a Nevada lawyer! But any fool can see the Abrams defendants are wise to give this prestidigitator an ultimatum — immediately withdraw your glaring misstatements of material fact,” continued Phillips, who added, “and if he persists in playing reindeer games, a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees would do quite nicely.”
Phillips explained the anti-SLAPP dynamic! “Look! It’s mathematically impossible for Sanson to win! C’mon! He already blew the statute of limitations! The only question is WHEN will Sanson tap-out! Asked another way, will Sanson tap-out BEFORE Jenny Abrams goes anti-SLAPP?”
Phillips departed the shallow waters: “Dig it. If Sanson taps-out first, then it’s a simple game over. However, if Jenny goes anti-SLAPP first, then Sanson CANNOT tap-out. Once my girl Jenny goes anti-SLAPP, it effectively precludes Sanson from dismissing his own action — and Sanson would thus remain on-the-hook for potential attorney’s fees PLUS the $10,000 bounty.”
Phillips then went deep: “Remember, this scenario played-out in the landmark case, Willick vs. Sanson! Along with Abrams, Willick also brought a STOOPID defamation lawsuit against Sanson. Then, Willick saw Abrams getting Shaq’d on anti-SLAPP, and Willick soon realized he too would have to pay attorney’s fees, plus a $10,000 bounty, and so, Willick tried to flee the battlefield by dismissing his own case, like the cowardly [expletive deleted] that he is! But Carson City wouldn’t let Willick dismiss!”
“That’s right! Once a defendant files an anti-SLAPP, the plaintiff may no longer dismiss his or her own case! In California, this principle is well-established. In Nevada, my boy Willick had to learn it the hard way!”
“How ironic! First, you got Willick ‘n Abrams, aka “Dumb ‘n Dumber,” who bring their cute, little TWINSIE lawsuits against Sanson, but then, they get banged on anti-SLAPP for attorney’s fees, plus the $10,000 bounty! But now, thanks to the ever-turning Wheel of Fate, the roles have been REVERSED! Now, you got Sanson facing attorney’s fees and FIVE bounties — at $10,000 apiece — for the FIVE Abrams defendants! So, yeah, it’s a RACE to the courthouse — will Sanson dismiss his [expletive deleted] lawsuit BEFORE Jenny brings down the anti-SLAPP thunder!“
Sources close to the investigation reveal the Abrams defendants have until Apr. 18, 2024 to file a responsive pleading.
Our I-Team checked the sporting odds at Caesar’s. Apparently, it’s a bullish bettor’s market. They’re giving 5:4 odds that the Abrams defendants will go full anti-SLAPP.
So, that’s our report from UFC APEX! And, yeah, we’re expecting a Freaky, Fast, Finish for Sanson and his bogus FLAWSUIT. 😀
EDITORIAL STAFF ATOMIC COURT WATCHERS ~ “I” TEAM
Next Week’s Cliffhanger Episode
Will the ABRAMS defendants move to declare SANSON vexatious?!
Will they allow FALCONI to submit a media request to broadcast ABRAMS’ highly anticipated 12(b)(5) motion? And, if so, will FALCONI publicly ridicule SANSON in the opening 15-second bumper of the ONJ video?
“If fools did not go to market cracked pots and false wares would not be sold.” James M. McGill, Esq.
Hey, stewardess, is there a movie on this flight?” Seriously?
Buckle-up! It’s gonna be one helluva bumpy ride!
Friends! Romans! Fight Fans! Atomic Court Watchers I-Team continues its LIVE, ongoing coverage of the ultimate, no-holds-barred, mixed martial arts, grudge match at UFC APEX! Daniel Cormier is calling it the Defamation Case of the Century! — Sanson vs. Abrams — Deux! [Clark County No. A-23-884249-C].
Atomic Court Watchers I-Team has gone behind the scenes! — to bring you an exclusive sneak peak at the ruling!
We’re good like that.
Ladies ‘n gents, without further ado, our Atomic Court Watchers I-Team exclusively presents this exclusive presentation!
So, click on the link to download Sanson vs. Abrams — Deux!
Taken just moments after prevailing, attorneys James M. McGill and Kimberly A. Wexler celebrate their victory over Steve Sanson and Veterans in Politics at Eighth Judicial District Court, (July 19, 2024). [Photo courtesy of UTI]
“Perfection is the enemy of the perfectly adequate.” James M. McGill, Esq.
by T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. California State Bar No. 165833 U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048
Dateline, Carson City, Nev. — Aug. 1, 2023.
Last week, on July 27, 2023, NevadaCourt of Appeals issued a published decision in the matter of Roe vs. Roe, [139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21; No. 84893–COA; (July 27, 2023)]. We here present the case with editorializations by civil rights attorney, T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.
“[A]n order for sole physical custody creates tension with a parent’s fundamental rights, Nevada public policy, and future modification rights.” — C.J. Michael P. Gibbons, Nevada Court of Appeals
Writing for the Court of Appeals, C.J. Michael P. Gibbons explains, “In this opinion, we … outline what a district court must consider when entering an order for sole physical custody,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (at p. 1–2); (bold italics added].
“In this opinion, we provide a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized. We direct district courts when entering an order for sole physical custody to first find either that the noncustodial parent is unfit for the child to reside with, or to make specific findings and provide an adequate explanation as to the reason primary physical custody is not in the best interest of the child,” [Roe vs. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21; No. 84893–COA; (July 27, 2023), (at p. 3) (bold italics added)].
C.J. Gibbons continues, “Following either of these findings, the district court must consider the least restrictive parenting time arrangement possible to avoid constraining the parent-child relationship any more than is necessary to prevent potential harm cause by an unfit parent and meet the best interest of the child. If the court enters a more restrictive parenting time arrangement than is otherwise available, it must explain how the greater restriction is in the child’s best interest,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 3)].
Constitutional enthusiasts statewide were quick to note C.J. Gibbons’ clear and unambiguous language: “The parent-children relationship is a fundamental liberty interest,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 15), citing, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); (bold italics added)].
Mr. Chief Justice Gibbons writes, “[a] permanent change to parenting time affects a parent’s fundamental rights concerning the custody of their child,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (pp. 15–16), (bold italics added), citing, Gordon v. Geiger, 133 Nev. at 546, 402 P.3d at 674, (2017)]. “Even parents deemed highly emotionally dysregulated retain their fundamental rights,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 16)].
Most significantly, C.J. Gibbons identifies three distinctive types of physical custody: “Nevada district courts enter one of three parenting time arrangements in a custodial order—joint, primary, or sole physical custody,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 16); (bold italics added].
What is sole physical custody? “[W]hen a district court enters an order that limits parenting time to restrictive supervised parenting time, virtual contact, phone calls, letters, texts, [etc.], it has entered an order for sole physical custody,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (pp. 18–19); (bold italics added)].
“Because the noncustodial parent’s care, custody, and control of their child is so severely restricted, sole physical custody orders implicate a parent’s fundamental rights . . . [C]hild custody decisions implicate due process rights because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (p. 19); (bold italics added)].
The Chief Justice shows compassion for constitutional procedure: “the severe restriction on the noncustodial parent’s care, custody, and control of their child requires additional findings and procedure,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 19); (bold italics added].
The Chief Justice articulates public policy: “the public policy of Nevada is to preserve and strengthen family life,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 19)]. “To protect a noncustodial parent’s rights, judicial discretion is tempered by this state’s policy of supporting ‘frequent associations and a continuing relationship’ between parent and child after the parents’ relationship which each other has ended,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 19), citing NRS § 125.001(1)].
C.J. Gibbons sets the *abuse-of-discretion* standard: “a district court risks abusing its discretion when it orders sole physical custody without sufficient cause or otherwise unnecessarily restricts and threatens the parent-child relationship,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (pp. 19–20)].
The Chief Justice suggests that sole physical custody must be linked to a finding of “unfitness,” (i.e., based on clear and convincing evidence of (i) child abuse, (ii) neglect, (iii) endangerment, or (iv) abandonment). The Chief Justice writes, “[t]o avoid unnecessary restrictions on parental rights, a district court must only enter an order for sole physical custody if it first finds either that the noncustodial parent is unfit for the child to reside with, or if it makes specific findings and provides an adequate explanation as to the reasons why primary physical custody is not in the best interests of the child.” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (pp. 20–21); (bold italics added)].
The Chief Justice further suggests strict scrutiny analysis: “After making either of these findings supporting sole physical custody, the district court must then order the least restrictive parenting time arrangement possible that is within the child’s best interests,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 21; (bold italics added)].
“When entering its custodial order, if a less restrictive parenting time arrangement is available, or proposed but rejected, the district court must provide an explanation as to how the best interest of the child is served by the greater restriction,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (p. 21)].
Ultimately, C.J. Gibbons finds that family court judge, Dawn Throne, committed legal error by: (1)failing to consider a less restrictive parenting time arrangement; (2) failing to adequately explain why the greater restriction was necessary; (3) failing to make findings how true primary physical custody was not in [the minor child’s] best interest; and (4) implementing an almost unachievable plan with no ending, review, or even status check date, and accordingly has undermined Nevada’s public policy, issued anorder inconsistent with Nevada jurisprudence, and violated [the mother’s] parental rights,” [Roe vs. Roe, id., (p. 24); (bold italics added)].
The Chief Justice finds abuse of discretion. “As a result, we conclude that [Dawn Throne] abused [her] discretion when [she] effectively awarded [] sole physical custody of the minor child,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (p. 24); (bold italics added)]. The COA then reverses Thorne. “Thus, we reverse the parenting time allocation and direct the district court, on remand, to enter a parenting time order consistent with Nevada jurisprudence and this opinion,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (p. 24); (bold italics added)].
In conclusion, C.J. Gibbons writes, “Sole physical custody is a custodial arrangement where the child resides with only one parent and the noncustodial parent’s parenting time is restricted to no significant in-person parenting time,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (p. 36)].
Most remarkable, the Chief Justice writes, “[a] district court entering an order for sole physical custody creates tension with a parent’s fundamental rights, Nevada public policy, and future modification rights,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (p. 36); (bold italics added)]. But what does it mean — to create tension — with a fundamental right? Absent findings of unfitness, do district judges have subject-matter jurisdiction, (“authority”), tocreate tension in the parent-child relationship? (At what point does judicial tension rise to the level of substantial interference?– i.e., when does the tension become constitutionally intolerable?)
The Chief Justice continues, “a district court must first find that either the noncustodial parent is unfit for the child to reside with, or it must make specific findings and provide an adequate explanation as to the reasons why primary physical custody is not in the best interest of the child,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (p. 36); (bold italics added)].
The Chief Justice again suggests strict scrutiny analysis. “Afterwards, the district court must enter the least restrictive parenting time arrangement possible consistent with a child’s best interest,” [Roe vs. Roe, id. (pp. 36–37); (bold italics added)].
“Should it enter a more restrictive order, it must explain how the greater restriction is in the child’s best interest. Moreover, it must retain its decision-making authority over future custodial modifications and parent time allocations, as well as enter order with sufficient specificity to allow enforcement. These steps are to ensure that when a district court enters an order for sole physical custody, it does so equitably and in accordance with Nevada’s statutes and jurisprudence, thereby preserving the noncustodial parent’s fundamental rights to the greatest degree possible,” [Roe vs. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21; No. 84893–COA; (July 27, 2023), (at p. 37); (bold italics added)].
~~TMP. (Aug. 1, 2023)
EDITOR’S NOTE
Our Atomic I-Team noted, at page 36 of the Roe decision, it states, “[a]n order for sole physical custody creates tension with a parent’s fundamental rights.” Okay, stop right there!
Note the awkward, euphemistic language, “creates tension.” Well, that’s one way to say it! Another way to say it might be that the judge, Dawn Throne, violated mom’s fundamental right to parent — which the 14th Amendment guarantees!
MELVIN GRIMES — Man or Mythology?
Melvin Grimes distinguishes himself from the run-of-the-mill attorneys who infest Clark County family court. Melvin is a breed apart!
But what makes Melvin so special? A unique blend of courage, gumption, and derring-do! Melvin boldly argues that parenting is a constitutional right — *IN* Clark County family court, (a barren, godless wasteland where federally protected civil rights go to quietly suffocate and die…).
Hear ye, hear ye! We salute the Bravehearts — such as Mel Grimes — i.e., attorneys who actually argue the Constitution in family court!
A constitutional scholar and man-about-town, Melvin knows and understands that custodial orders may not restrict or limit one’s fundamental “right to parent” absent a showing of “unfitness” — based on clear and convincing evidence of: (i) child abuse, (ii) child neglect, (iii) child endangerment, or (iv) child abandonment.
It was a once-in-a-lifetime interview. Our Atomic I-Team met-up with Melvin *Primary Custody* Grimes — at a Dotty’s on Boulder Hwy. Grimes wasted no time. “Listen up,” said Grimes. “New rule!–family court judges must order the least restrictive parenting time arrangement possible!”
A trailblazing maverick, Grimes urged our I-Team members and Dotty’s patrons, “You should see recent published decisions and see what real lawyering looks like. Let me help you … go to Nevada Supreme Court website and search the Nevada advanced opinions for a brand new case about custody. Then read the briefs… that is what a real lawyer can do for people!”
Every living soul at Dotty’s was awestruck. Weak-kneed ladies helplessly swooned. Stout-hearted men openly wept.
Grimes explained that, “Under the Troxel presumption, fit parents are presumed to be acting in the best interests of their children.” Grimes continued, “When it comes to fit parents, no family court judge may infringe upon — or otherwise create tension with — the fundamental right to parent — which is a liberty interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees unto We The People!”
Our Atomic I-Team asked Grimes what Roe means for Clark County family court. “C’mon! It’s a game-changer!” “From now on,” Grimes explained, “custody orders must be narrowly tailored — with the least restrictive custody arrangement possible.” Grimes added, “Furthermore, the trial judge must devise a game plan or road map to reinstate those custodial rights that the outlier parent lost — along with periodic status checks.”
On that sultry, summer afternoon at Dotty’s, all eyes and ears were trained on Melvin Grimes, who worked the crowd, liberally dispensing business cards and warmly shaking hands with locals!
So, is Grimes now a heavy hitter? We put that question to civil rights attorney, T. Matthew Phillips. “Are you effin kidding me?!” exclaimed Phillips. “Melvin is a letter-high fastball over the centerfield wall — home run, y’all!”
Phillips added, “In the vast majority of divorce cases, we see two fit parents standing before the court. In such instances, the Equal Protection Clause demands that both parents share equal and undivided physical custody, fifty-fifty! Why?—because both parents are similarly situated in the eyes of the law — because Torxel’s fitness presumptionapplies to both parents equally.”
JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY—FOR ALL “FIT” PARENTS!
Because the best interests of the children demand equal access to two loving parents.
DATELINE: Sacramento, Calif., June 14, 2023 — Yesterday, the California Senate passed Assembly Bill No. 957, which provides that parents may lose custody of their children — and ultimately go to jail — if they refuse to “affirm” their child’s transgender status.
And now, Sacramento insiders today revealed that California Governor, Gavin Newsome, will soon sign Senate Bill No. 182 — which requires Child Protective Services, (“CPS”), to perform “in-home inspections” and “custody evaluations” prior to moms being allowed to leave hospitals with newborns.
Proponents hail the bill as a victory for neonatal rights. However, opponents see it as another Newsom assault on constitutional rights.
In support, Dr. Kaye Shozeh, California Dept. of Soc. Svcs., stated, “The health and safety of your child is our top priority.”
According to family law experts, the State’s paramount concern is the child’s “best interests.”
Senior litigation attorney, Wilfrid Robarts, Esq., San Bernardino County Fathers’ Rights Legal Group, explained, “Yes, the State has authority to enter your home — to ensure the safety of your kids.”
In opposition, California civil rights attorney, T. Matthew Phillips, Esq., spouted, “No! — this is one of the most overreaching governmental overreaches in the history of governmental overreach!“
Attorney Phillips added, “Seriously, am I the only one who watched AMC Breaking Bad? — Remember Jesse Pinkman in the R.V.?” — “This is my own private domicile — and I will not be harassed …. B-word!“
State Senator, Richard Pan — who last week announced his bid for Mayor of Sacramento — supports RainbowAmendments to the Constitution — to ensure the safety of all t-children.
On a related note, an unnamed Sacramento insider described the Constitution as a “stale-dated document written by toxic, white males who owned slaves and wouldn’t even let women vote.”
Our I-Team spoke with New Mexico criminal rights attorney, Saul Goodman, Esq., who believes the bill is unconstitutional. “C’mon! — the Fourth Amendment prohibits CPS from entering your home — unless they have a search warrant supported by probable cause! — Now, what’s for lunch, huh?”
Sources close to the investigation indicate the proposed bill could be on Newsom’s desk early next week. ~~ Maggie Corbin (Contributing Editor)
* * *
Yes, you’ve been hoaxed. 🙂
There is, of course, no S.B. 182 — this is just a glimpse into the dark future that lay ahead for American parents.
If you believe the gov’t has no authority to impose in-home inspections — at the time of birth — then by what authority does the gov’t impose such inspections — at the time of divorce?
A.B. 957, on the other hand, is very real indeed.
The cold, hard truth about A.B. 957 is this — if parents refuse to affirm that their t-children should be castrated (by puberty blockers), then those parents will lose custody and go to jail — and the State will then castrate their children — free from parental interference.
Know your rights!
Tell others!
#AtomicCourtWatchers
Produced and Directed by TMP’s Midnight Minions in association with Chapter Eleven Productions, Fly-By-Night Management Services, and Neurotica Entertainment Group
Copyright 2023 – by T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.
“Freedom means nothing if you can’t keep the government away from your children.” ~ T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. ~
by T. Matthew Phillips, Esq. California State Bar No. 165833 U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048
“One Hundred Year Anniversary of the Right to Parent!” June 4, 1923 to June 4, 2023
One hundred years ago today — on June 4, 1923 — the U.S. Supreme Court established the “right to parent” as a fundamental right — i.e., a “liberty” interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees.
Know Your Rights The Constitution mentions certain rights, which we label as “constitutional” rights; however, there are other rights of constitutional magnitude — which, curiously enough, the Constitution never mentions — such as the right to “privacy,” “marriage,” and “parenting” — which we label as “fundamental” rights. And remember, “fundamental” rights are accorded “constitutional” status and protection.
Constitutional Rights vs. Fundamental Rights In the eyes of the law, both “constitutional” rights and “fundamental” rights are accorded the same legal status — with the same constitutional safeguards and procedures. The only difference is that “constitutional” rights are actually mentioned in the Constitution, while “fundamental” rights, strictly speaking, are not.
Examples Examples of constitutional rights include the right to “free speech” and the right to “keep and bear,” which, of course, are written into the Constitution — while examples of fundamental rights include the rights to “privacy,” “marriage,” and “parenting,” which are not mentioned in the Constitution.
Not in the Constitution–But Still Constitutional That’s right, the words, “privacy,” “marriage,” and “parenting,” never appear in the Constitution; but still, we consider them to be constitutional rights — more precisely, fundamental rights — which means that “privacy,” “marriage,” and “parenting” receive constitutional status and protection — as if those terms had been specifically written into the Constitution.
Fundamental Rights Can Be Eliminated There is, notably, one glaring difference between constitutional rights and fundamental rights. The Supreme Court may not eliminate constitutional rights, because, of course, such rights are enshrined in the Constitution; however, the Court may indeed eliminate fundamental rights — just like they did recently — when they declared that “abortion” is no longer a fundamental right — in last year’s Dobbs decision, (June 24, 2022).
Roe vs. Wade Way back in 1973, the Supreme Court decided that abortion is a fundamental right and that abortion should be granted constitutional status and protection; but then, remarkably, 49 years later, in 2022, the Supreme Court reversed its own decision — and just like that — abortion was no longer a fundamental right, no longer accorded constitutional status and protection.
Moral-of-the-Story The notion of “what” constitutes a fundamental right is liable to change at any time — depending on the particular mood of The People as reflected through the nation’s highest court.
Legal Criteria Okay, but what criteria does the Supreme Court use? How do they determine whether a so-called “right” should be deemed fundamental (or not)? The answer turns on whether the activity in question has been “deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.” Has this supposed right, for the last 800-or-so years, been an “essential component of the scheme of ordered liberty?”
An Unruly Horse Making an inquiry into whether a supposed right has been ingrained into the “scheme of ordered liberty” is like trying to sip champagne astride an unruly horse — it’s difficult. But still, nine solemn individuals — cloaked in quasi-religious attire — ultimately decide the trajectory of the tennis ball — which may quite randomly fall on either side of the net.
Contraception is a Fundamental Right Take, for example, the right to “contraception.” Is this a fundamental right? Well, ask yourself: is contraception “deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition?” Yes! It is. Back in 1965, the Supreme Court declared that contraception is indeed a fundamental right. Okay, what about physician-assisted suicide? Just ask yourself: has physician-assisted suicide, during the last 800-or-so years, been an “essential component of the scheme of ordered liberty?” Hmm…
Physician-Assisted Suicide is Not Back in 1997, the Supreme Court faced the issue of physician-assisted suicide. Is it a fundamental right? The high court said, “No,” which means there are no minimum constitutional safeguards or procedures for physician-assisted suicide.
Location is Everything Today, when individuals seek abortion or physician-assisted suicide, they must be present in states that have legalized abortion or physician-assisted suicide. The federal gov’t neither guarantees nor protects abortion or physician-assisted suicide. These supposed “rights” are not deemed fundamental — why? — because neither were found to fall within the “liberty” interest guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The Due Process Clause The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment guarantees “liberty” unto The People. Okay, but what does “liberty” even mean? What exactly does the 14th Amendment guarantee?
The Liberty Interest According to the Supreme Court, the 14th Amendment “liberty” interest includes activities that, historically speaking, are fundamental to the American way of life, for example, “privacy,” “marriage,” “contraception,” “parenting,” etc.
Jazz-Age Party-Time It’s party time! One hundred years ago today, the Supreme Court declared that the 14th Amendment “liberty” interest includes the “right to parent.”
Let freedom ring! 🙂
Meyer vs. Nebraska In Meyer vs. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390 (1923)], the Supreme Court defined the “liberty” interest to include the fundamental “right to parent,” which means the right to care, custody, and control of one’s children; so too, children enjoy an accompanying right, i.e., the “right to be parented” by their natural parents.
On This Day in History One hundred years ago today, on June 4, 1923, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Meyer vs. Nebraska. In 1919, Nebraska had passed a law prohibiting teaching school children any language other than English. Mr. Meyer, who taught German in a Lutheran school, was convicted under this statute. Issue: Did the Nebraska statute violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Yes. The statute violated the “liberty” interest that the Due Process Clause guarantees.
Liberty Means More than ‘Merely Freedom from Bodily Restraint’ “Liberty,” the high court explained, means more than “merely freedom from bodily restraint.” “Liberty” also includes the fundamental right of a parochial school teacher to teach German to a 10-year-old student, as well as the parent’s fundamental right to control the upbringing of their child — in any language — as they see fit.
“Liberty” Defined In Meyer vs. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390 (1923)], the Supreme Court declared that the “liberty” interest includes at least seven things: (1) the right to freely enter into contracts; (2) the right to freely choose one’s occupation; (3) the right to freely pursue education; (4) the right to freely marry; (5) the right to freely establish a home and bring up children; (6) the right to freely worship God, (likewise guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); and, most curious of all, (7) the right to freely enjoy common law privileges essential to the “scheme of ordered liberty.”
Language of the Supreme Court On June 4, 1923 — with Mr. Justice McReynolds writing for the majority — the Taft Court held that —
“Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” [Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, at 399 (1923)]
Parenting is a Fundamental Right Yes, the right to parent is a fundamental right — it’s accorded constitutional status and protection; therefore, the state may not infringe on the right to parent — unless the state observes minimum constitutional safeguards and procedures.
Your Family Court Judge Does your family court judge know the case of Meyer vs. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390 (1923)]?–or that it declared parenting a fundamental right accorded constitutional status and protection? Does your judge understand that family courts may not separate children from parents, unless the state observes minimum constitutional safeguards and procedures?
¯\_(ツ)_/¯
Know your rights!
Tell others!
“Freedom means nothing if you can’t keep the government away from your children.”
Thirteen SCOTUS Decisions on Parenting! by T. Matthew Phillips, Attorney-at-Law U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048
Meyer vs. Nebraska — (1923)
Meyer vs. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390 (1923): One hundred years ago, SCOTUS first recognized the right to parent as a “liberty” interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees. Mr. Meyer, a school-teacher, was convicted on a criminal statute for teaching the German language, in a parochial school, to a 10-year-old. SCOTUS held that the statute invaded the “liberty” interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees.
SCOTUS ruled that the 14th Amendment, “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,” [Meyer vs. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); (bold italics added)].
“Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life,” [id. at 400]. “His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment,” [id. at 400].
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters – (1925)
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925): SCOTUS held that the 14th Amendment “liberty” interest excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children — by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations,” [Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); (bold italics added)].
Prince vs. Massachusetts – (1944)
Prince vs. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944): SCOTUS struck-down a state statute, which provided that no minor shall sell, in public places, any newspapers, magazines or periodicals.
“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder . . . And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” [Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); (bold italics added)].
Stanley vs. Illinois – (1972)
Stanley vs. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972): Under state law, children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, were declared wards of the state — with no hearing on the father’s fitness and no proof of child neglect by the father. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a father could be separated from his children upon mere proof that he and the dead mother were not married and they further held that father’s fitness was irrelevant. SCOTUS reversed, holding that unmarried fathers have a 14th Amendment liberty interest in raising their children.
“[T]he State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents,” [Stanley vs. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)].
“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him,” [id. at 645; (bold italics added]. “Parental unfitness must be established on the basis of individualized proof,” [id. at 645].
“The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection,” [id., at 651]. “We think the Due Process Clause mandates a similar result here. The State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father,” [id., at 658].
SCOTUS ruled that, under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, father was “entitled to ahearing on [his] fitness” as a parent before the state took his children and placed them in guardianships, [id., at 647–658; (bold italics added)].
Under the Due Process Clause, the state cannot “justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family,” [id. at 658]. “[A]ll Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody,” [id., at 658; (bold italics added)].
Wisconsin vs. Yoder – (1972)
Wisconsin vs. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972): Members of the Amish community were convicted for violating the State’s compulsory school attendance law. SCOTUS reversed these convictions under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
“The values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society,” [Wisconsin vs. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, at 213–214 (1972)]. “Even more markedly than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children,” [id., at 232; (bold italics added)]. “This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition,” [id., at 232; (bold italics added)].
Moore vs. East Cleveland – (1977)
Moore vs. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977): An Ohio housing ordinance limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of a single family; however, the ordinance defined “family” in such a way that one particular household — consisting of a mother, her son, and her two grandsons — did not qualify for occupancy, and in fact, constituted a crime. SCOTUS overturned the mother’s criminal conviction.
“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’shistory and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural,” [Moore vs. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, at 503–504 (1977); (bold italics added)].
Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families – (1977)
Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977): This case raised the novel question of whether foster homes are entitled to the same constitutional deference as biological families. SCOTUS ruled that, “[t]he liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in “this Nation’s history and tradition.” ” [Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977), citing Moore vs. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, at 503; (bold italics added)].
“If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on “the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” ” [Smith, supra, at 862-863, citing Prince vs. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); (bold italics added)].
Quilloin vs. Walcott – (1978)
Quilloin vs. Walcott, 434U.S. 246 (1978): Georgia law required only the mother’s consent for the adoption of an illegitimate child. Here, an unmarried father tried to halt adoption of his illegitimate child. However, the father had taken no steps to support or legitimate the child over a period of 11 years; so too, the father had never been a member of the child’s family unit. As a result, SCOTUS upheld the adoption.
“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected,” [Quilloin vs. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); (bold italics added)]. “We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended, “if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest,” ” [Quilloin, supra, at 255; citing Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977); (bold italics added)].
Parham vs. J.R. – (1979)
Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979): SCOTUS validated the State’s procedures for admitting children to state mental hospitals. “The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children,” [Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); (bold italics added)].
“The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition,” [Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)]. “Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state,” [id., at 603]. “[W]e conclude that our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child should apply,” [id. at 604; (bold italics added)].
Santosky vs. Kramer – (1982)
Santosky vs. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982): Under New York law, the state could terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their children — upon a finding that the child is permanently neglected.
“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State,” [Santosky vs. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); (bold italics added)]. “Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life,” [id., at 753].
“Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence,” [id., at 746; (bold italics added)]. “[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship,” [id., at 760); (bold italics added)].
“[T]he parens patriae interest favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds,” [id., at 767–768); (bold italics added)]. “Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate a parent’s rights without showing parental unfitness,” [id., at footnote 10; (bold italics added)]. “Any parens patriae interest in terminating the natural parents’ rights arises only at the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unfit,” [id., at footnote 17].
Rotary Int’l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte – (1987)
Rotary Int’l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987): Rotary Int’l excluded women from membership, while Rotary Duarte admitted women; as a result, Rotary Int’l terminated Rotary Duarte’s membership in the international organization. By requiring Rotary Clubs in California to admit women, California’s anti-discrimination statute does not violate the First Amendment. So too, the statute did not unduly interfere with club members’ freedom of private association.
“We have emphasized that the First Amendment protects those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose “deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” ” [Rotary Int’l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987), citing, Roberts vs. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-620 (1984); (bold italics added)].
Reno vs. Flores – (1993)
Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993): Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation provided that alien juveniles — detained on suspicion of being deportable — may be released only to a parent, legal guardian, or other related adult. SCOTUS held that the regulation accords with the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act.
SCOTUS held that the Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference with fundamental rights and liberty interests, [Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993)].
“ “The best interests of the child,” a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody. But it is not traditionally the sole criterion — much less the sole constitutional criterion — for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others,” [Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)].
“ “[T]he best interests of the child” is not the legal standard that governs parents’ or guardians’ exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves,” [id., at 304; (bold italics added)].
Troxel vs. Granville – (2000)
Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000): The State of Washington had allowed “any person” to petition for visitation rights, and further allowed family courts to grant visitation where it served a child’s “best interests.” The grandparents, (the Troxels), successfully petitioned for visitation with the children of their deceased son. The mother, (Granville), objected to the amount of visitation ordered. The Washington Supreme Court held that state law unconstitutionally infringed on the mother’s fundamental right to parent. SCOTUS affirmed, holding that the Washington law, as applied, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause. “First, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, citing Parham vs. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; (bold italics added)].
“[T]here is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to make the best decisions regarding their children,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), citing Reno vs. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, at 304 (1993)].
According to the Washington Supreme Court, “the Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child,” [id. at 57; (bold italics added)]. The state statute was too broad; it allowed “any person” to petition, with the only requirement being whether visitation served the child’s “best interests.” States may interfere with the right to parent only to prevent harm to a child. “[T]here is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to make the best decisions regarding their children,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000); (bold italics added)]. “[T]he State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding visitation with third parties,” [id. at 58].
“The liberty interest at issue in this case — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court,” [Troxel vs. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); (bold italics added)].
SCOTUS noted that “the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children,” [id. at 68].
“In effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters,” [id. at 69]. “In that respect, the court’s presumption failed to provide any protection for Granville’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters,” [id. at 69–70]. “Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination,” [id. at 70].
“The Washington Superior Court failed to accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any material weight,” [id. at 72]. “As we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made,” [id. at 72–73].
“We have long recognized that a parent’s interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” [id. at 77].
These Supreme Court case law citations form the basis of our proposed Parental Bill of Rights (click below!)
THE PARENTAL BILL of RIGHTS by T. Matthew Phillips, Attorney-at-Law U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048
A proposed BILL to ensure the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS of PARENTS are honored and protected in the nation’s FAMILY COURTS.
The 14th Amendment guarantees “liberty,” which includes the People’s right to raise children; this fundamental right to parent includes the right to care, custody, and control of one’s children; so too, children enjoy an accompanying right, i.e., the right to be parented by their natural parents.
All parents are presumed fit. No court may restrict or terminate a parent’s custodial rights unless there is first a fitness proceeding — where the state proves child abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., which can be objectively verified without resort to judicial discretion.
A properly noticed fitness proceeding must include: (i) notice to the accused parent concerning the factual allegations of child abuse or neglect, and (ii) an admonition that, if the accused parent is found unfit — based on clear and convincing evidence — the state may restrict or terminate that parent’s custodial rights.
Fit parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children; absent findings of unfitness, equal protection demands that two fit parents share equal and undivided custodial rights.
A child’s best interests reside with fit parents; absent findings of unfitness, the state may not enter the private family realm. No court has legal authority, (“jurisdiction”), to determine a child’s best interests — unless both parents are deemed unfit after a properly noticed fitness trial.
Unless there is actual harm to a child — meaning abuse or neglect as defined by black-letter law — a parent’s bad behavior or felonious misconduct provides no legal basis to restrict or terminate custodial rights. No court may restrict or terminate custodial rights as punishment for misconduct against any person, including the other parent.
All orders restricting or terminating custodial rights must include strict scrutiny analyses, i.e., was the custody order narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling gov’t interest?—and, did the court employ the least-restrictive means of effectuating that interest?
The First Amendment guarantees a fundamental right to familial association — including the right to private speech with one’s children. No court may impose time, place, or manner restrictions on a parent’s right to free speech with a child, (e.g., at supervised visits), unless that parent is found unfit.
All temporary custody orders must have expiration dates; temporary custody orders with no expiration dates are null and void. No temporary order restricting custodial rights shall remain in effect longer than 60 days, after which: (i) the order must expire, or (ii) a fitness trial must commence.
All parents in domestic proceedings are presumed innocent of criminal accusations unless or until the state, in a criminal proceeding, proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to a criminal complaint, (“indictment”). No court may sua sponte conclude that a parent committed a crime.
Dateline: Las Vegas, Nev., Nov. 11, 2022. Unnamed sources close to the investigation indicate that a Clark County family court judge — Mathew P. Harter — died on Wed. Nov. 9, 2022, having committed suicide with a firearm.
Harter was on administrative leave at the time.
Our Atomic I-Team managed to obtain, from unofficial sources, an unofficial copy of Harter’s suicide note, which we below reproduce and transcribe.
TRANSCRIBED
“I hear the cries of children at night. I see their faces grow sallow with alienation. Who draws the line between what’s wrong and right?”
“And when I ask what my life’s been for, it’s all been for nothing. Save your regrets for the dead. Pain is for the living. It hurts so much. This suffering must stop. (Unintelligible)”
“This I do knowing that, for once, I acted in the best interests of the children.”
MPH
MANDATORY PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS
for ALL FAMILY COURT JUDGES NOW!
And when they demand YOUR psych evaluation, insist they produce an affidavit supported by probable cause!
“Through the Looking-Glass: Summary of TMP’s Arguments to the U.S. Supreme Court” by T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.
First,family courts wrongfully allow parents to act as “private prosecutors” — to privately prosecute criminal causes of action against one another. However, parents lack “standing” to bring criminal complaints in the midst of child custody disputes. Besides, there’s no such thing as a private right to bring criminal causes of action. Only the state may bring criminal causes of action — and only in the name of the People. Where litigants are allowed to play the dual roles of “prosecutor” and “victim,” the case wrongfully morphs into a “vigilante” proceeding. Family courts violate the right to a fair trial, [14th Amdt] by allowing vigilante justice — with one parent playing the role of both “victim” and “prosecutor.”
Second,family courts wrongfully allow judges, with no underlying criminal complaint, (aka “indictment”), to try and convict parents on criminal statutes. Family court judges routinely find and conclude that parents violate criminal statutes — despite the fact that there are no underlying criminal complaints, (“indictments”). However, where there are no underlying criminal complaints, no judge has subject-matter jurisdiction, (“legal authority”), to make criminal findings and conclusions. Family courts violate due process, [14th Amdt], by trying and convicting parents on criminal statutes — with no supporting criminal complaint. Sadly, the accused parents never receive notice of (i) the criminal facts alleged, nor (ii) the criminal statutes allegedly violated. But again, with no underlying criminal complaint, the family court judge necessarily lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, (“legal authority”), to adjudicate criminal accusations. And, perhaps more importantly, where judges lack subject-matter jurisdiction, for want of a supporting indictment, such judges are powerless to issue orders; and, where judges do issue orders with no subject-matter jurisdiction — such orders are deemed nullities — “void” ab initio, of no force or effect, from the date of issuance.
Third, family courts wrongfully allow judges to conclude that parents violate criminal statutes based on “clear and convincing” evidence, but this standard-of-proof is too low. When it comes to adjudicating criminal statutes, the proper evidentiary standard, of course, is the constitutional standard, i.e., “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Family courts violate due process, [14th Amdt], by using a standard-of-proof too low for criminal statutes; (and, now that you mention it, criminal statutes should be argued in criminal courts in the first place!). Ironically, both family courts and criminal courts convict individuals on the same criminal statutes — but with different evidentiary standards. For example, criminal courts adjudicate NRS 207.190, (“coercion”), on the higher, “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard; however, family courts relax the evidentiary standard — adjudicating the same criminal statute — on the lower, “clear-and-convincing” standard. Truth is, in family courts, criminal statutes are put to an “off-label” use. Criminal statutes are obviously designed and intended to put the bad guys behind bars, but family courts use the same criminal statutes as pretext to kidnap your children! Again, the proper evidentiary standard on criminal statutes is the constitutional standard, i.e., “beyond a reasonable doubt” — regardless of whether the courthouse happens to be labeled “C” for “criminal” or “F” for “family.” And, most significantly, the “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard must be decided, not by a judge, but by a jury!
Fourth, family courts wrongfully allow judges to control the fact-finding by abolishing the parent’s right to trial-by-jury — the most precious of all civil liberties. Jury trials are the last best hope to check unbridled judicial discretion (which may explain why Las Vegas, Nevada designed its family court with NO jury boxes!). But still, where litigants face criminal accusations — and the possible punishment is limitation or termination of fundamental rights, (for example, the right to parent) — such litigants are entitled to a jury trial. Family courts violate the Sixth Amendment — by denying jury trials to parents accused of violating criminal statutes — in instances where the possible punishment includes deprivation of parental rights, which, for parents, is an ever-present Sword of Damocles!
Fifth, family courts wrongfully allow judges to conclude that parents violate criminal statutes, even though the parents are never proven guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt” — and this defeats the constitutional “presumption of innocence.” Remember, unless or until the state proves guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” family court judges must presume all parents are innocent — and that they never violated a criminal statute. Until the moment comes when the state actually proves a parent guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt,” no judge may conclude that a parent violated a criminal statute. By allowing judges to conclude that parents violate criminal statutes — despite the fact that the state has never proven guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” — family court violates the parent’s right to “presumption of innocence,” [5th & 6th Amdts].
To justify the rampant judicial kidnappings, family courts must turn parents into criminals. And thus, the objective of family court is the mass criminalization of American parents. Notably, this criminalization comes, not in the criminal court system, but in the family court system — where criminal allegations are much easier to prove because family court features: (i) no indictment requirement, (ii) a private prosecutor, (iii) a relaxed evidentiary standard, (iv) no presumption of innocence, and (v) no jury trials.
The question presented is this — where parents stand accused of violating criminal statutes, and possible punishments include limitation or termination of parental rights, must family courts recognize the parents’ entitlement to the “rights of the accused?” — [5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments]? “Yes!” — because the constitutional right to parent hangs in the balance! The “rights of the accused” should indeed extend to family court parents accused of violating criminal statutes — in instances where the possible punishment includes limitation or termination of parental rights. In America, all persons accused of crimes — who stand to lose fundamental liberties — are entitled to the benefits and protections of the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.
Rule-of-Law — where parents stand accused of committing crimes, and possible punishments include deprivations of parental rights, family courts must recognize the accused parents’ rights under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments.
Know your rights! ~~TMP.
“Call the first witness,” said the King; and the White Rabbit blew three blasts on the trumpet, and called out, “First witness!”
DOWN the RABBIT HOLE!
Does the King of Hearts have subject-matter jurisdiction, (legal authority), to try the Knave of Hearts — for stealing the Queen’s tarts? Well, it depends on whether the Knave has been indicted on a burglary or theft statute. The 14th Amendment requires the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office to file a criminal complaint, (aka “indictment”), containing due process notice of some burglary or theft-related statute.
The 14th Amendment provides that the Knave of Hearts is entitled to receive a criminal complaint containing due process notice, which means notice of (i) the criminal facts surrounding the tarts, and (ii) the criminal statutes allegedly violated.
Must the King legally presume the Knave innocent? Yes! — his innocence must be presumed — until the day comes when the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office actually proves the Knave guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And, in order to maintain his presumption of innocence, the King may not conclude that the Knave violated any criminal statute — unless or until a jury so concludes — and only under the constitutional standard of proof, i.e., the “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard, [see 5th and 6th Amdts.].
Should the King of Hearts be allowed to play the role of “prosecutor?” No! — because his wife, (the Queen), is the “victim!” Vigilante justice defeats the right to a “fair trial,” [see 14th Amdt.]. If charges are to be brought, the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office must bring them — and bring them in the name of the People.
Next, may the Wonderland District Attorney’s Office establish guilt under the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard? No! — criminal cases must be proven to a Wonderland jury, “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Finally, is the Knave of Hearts entitled to trial-by-jury? Boy howdy! Of course, he is! The Sixth Amendment requires trial-by-jury. So too, the Fifth Amendment entitles the Knave to Miranda warnings, preliminary hearings, and assistance of counsel, etc.
“In the very middle of the court was a table, with a large dish of tarts upon it: they looked so good, that it made Alice quite hungry to look at them–`I wish they’d get the trial done,’ she thought, `and hand around the refreshments!'”
Atomic Court Watchers 